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NOTE
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN SOUTH CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION
It would be folly to attempt to set forth the entire body of
the law of independent contractors on these few pages. There-
fore, this note is confined to a presentation of the broad prin-
ciples of this field of the law and to a humble attempt to
bring together and analyze the decided cases in South Caro-
lina in relation to these principles. In short, this is an effort
to determine the status of the independent contractor in South
Carolina and does not purport to deal with all phases of the
law.
GENERAL DEFINITIONS
It is fitting to begin with the general definition of the term
"independent contractor" although it is not capable of exact
definition. There are many definitions which for the most part
follow a general pattern, but perhaps the most quoted and
often used is, that:
An independent contractor is one, who, exercising an
independent employment, contracts to do certain work
according to his own methods, and without being subject
to the control of his employer, except as to the product or
result of his work.'
Another good definition which substantially follows this one
is:
The independent contractor is one who exercises some
independent employment, in the course of which he un-
dertakes, supplying his own materials, servants and
equipment, to accomplish a certain result, not being sub-
ject while doing so to the direction and control of his
employer, but being responsible to him for the end to be
1. 27 Am. Jur. 481; 14 R. C. L. 67 - Definitions collected - BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (3rd Ed. 1933); BouvER's LAw DICTIONARY (8th Ed.
1915). See Note: 19 A. L. R. 226.
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achieved rather than for the means by which he accom-
plishes it.2
Any further definitions would be mere repetition and those
above are sufficient for the purposes of this article.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DISTINGUISHED FRom SERVANTS
AND AGENTS GENERALLY
The law of independent contractors is part of the much
greater field of the law of agency. Therefore, it is necessary
to distinguish an independent contractor from both agents
and servants generally before giving closer scrutiny to the
independent contractor himself.
"The word 'servant' is used in contrast with 'independent
contractor', a term which includes all persons who contract to
do something for another and who are not servants with re-
spect thereto. An agent who is not a servant is, therefore, an
independent contractor when he contracts to act on account
of the principal. ' 3
"Agent" is a word used to describe a person authorized by
another to act on his account and under his control. An agent
nay be one who, to distinguish him from a servant in deter-
mining the liability of the principal, is called an independent
contractor. Thus, the attorney at law, the broker, the factor,
the auctioneer, and other similar persons employed either for a
single transaction or for a series of transactions are agents, al-
though, as to their physical activities, they are independent
contractors.4 Of the two, servants and agents, the agent more
nearly corresponds to the independent contractor than does the
servant but they are both distinguishable mainly on the
grounds of control.3 It is not necessary to delve deeper into the
distinction between servants and agents and for the sake of
brevity and clarity, they will both be referred to as "agents" as
distinguished from "independent contractors" in the following
discussion.
2. I MECHEM, AGENCY, § 40 (2nd Ed. 1914).
3. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 2 comment A (1933).
4. Id., § 2 comment (d)
5. 2 Am. Jur 17; 14 R. C. L. 67; see Note: 19 A. L. R. 253, 2 C. J. S.
1027.
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FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED
The legal literature about the independent contractor has
been occupied, almost exclusively, with the question of how
best to identify him.6 To determine just who he is, we must of
necessity establish some guides or factors to be considered
in ascertaining him. The authorities are not wanting in this
respect and have set forth a myriad of criteria. In determining
the relationship of the employer and independent contractor,
the following matters of fact, among others, are to be con-
sidered: "1. The extent of control which, by the agreement,
the master may exercise over the details of the work; 2.
Whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business; 3. The kind of occupation, with ref-
erence to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done un-
der the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; 4. The skill required in the particular occupation;
5. Whether the employer or the workman supplys the instru-
mentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work; 6. The length of time for which the person is em-
ployed; 7. The method of payment, whether by time or by the
job; 8. Whether or not the work is a part of the regular busi-
ness of the employer; 9. Whether or not the parties believe
they are creating the relationship of master and servant."T7
Other factors to be considered are the power to terminate the
relationship, 8 control of the contractor's servants,9 by whom
the contractor's servants are paid,10 and so on ad infinitum.
Perhaps a short discussion of the more important of these
factors or criteria would be in order at this point of the dis-
cussion.
Control-Control might well be deemed the prime factor to.
be considered in determining the relationship of employer and
independent contractor. In fact, the theory underlying the
doctrine of the non-liability of an employer for the acts of
independent contractor is that a person ought not to answer
for the conduct of another over whom he has no control. An
examination of any case involving the law of independent
6. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 UN. OF CH.
L. Rav. 501 (1935).
7. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 220 (1933).
8. 56 C. J. S. 56.
9. Id. at 57.
10. 27 Am. Jur. 497.
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contractors will reveal a discussion of control at one point or
another. It is important to realize that it matters not whether
the employer exercised actual control over the conduct of the
work if he has the right to control." Of course, some amount
of control is reserved to the employer, but the whole question
in determining the relationship is a matter of degree. A ref-
erence to the general definition of an independent contractor
reveals that the employer has control of the result but not
of the means of performance. Mere supervision or right of in-
spection does not necessarily change the relationship to that of
principal and agent where the means of performance are with-
in the control of the contractor. 12 Other aspects of the factor
of control, other than those concerning work and control of
the means of performance of it, are control of the premises
where the work is being done, the right to alter the plans, con-
trol of the contractor's workmen, and others which may be
incorporated generally with those just mentioned.'
3
Independent Calling or Employment-The mere fact that one
is engaged in a separate and independent employment is not
conclusive that he is an independent contractor. However, it
does have some weight for persons in some particular occupa-
tions are naturally regarded as being independent. Further-
more, persons in business for themselves, or owning their
own businesses, are less likely to be the agents or servants
of another than those persons who have no particular calling
or occupation, but who merely do what they can when they
can, and for whom they can.
"An examination of what part of the world's work he per-
forms daily is revealing. He has been busy. He is the builder,
the broker, the stevedore, the hostler, the architect, the ware-
houseman; he paints your house, he repairs your automobile,
your windows, handles your collections, sells your real estate,
procures your divorce, and so on ad infinitum. He is the small
businessman incarnate, the last stubborn refuge of rugged
individualism."16
Skill--The skill required in the particular occupation is an
important factor, and one closely related to the factor just dis-
11. Notes: 65 L. R. A. 448, 490; 75 A. L. R. 725; 19 ANN. CAS. 10.
,12. See note 11, supra.
13. 14 R. C. L. 65; Note: 20 A. L. R. 684.
14. See note 11, supra; 27 Am. Jur. 498.
15. Notes: 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380; 19 A. L. R. 226.
16. See note 6, supra.
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cussed. Although the skill one possesses is not conclusive that
he is an independent contractor, it is persuasive. It tends to
show that one does have an independent calling, or in any
event, could exercise an independent employment. In many
instances, however, this factor is wholly disregarded.17
Furnishing Workmen or Materials-Again, not decisive, but
worthy of consideration, is the question of who furnishes the
workmen or materials. Generally speaking, independent con-
tractors furnish the means for the doing of the work, while
agents or servants use the means afforded by the master.1 s
However, one may still be an independent contractor when
he has control of the conduct of the work, although an em-
ployer furnishes and pays certain workmen or certain ma-
terials and tools.10
Mode and Time of Payment-This is still another important,
but not controlling factor. Whether the compensation is by
the day, in a lump sum, or on a commission basis, is not, of
itself, a material factor.20 Several circumstances tending to
indicate the relationship are, generally: where one contracts
to perform certain work as a whole for a specified sum,2'
where the remuneration to the person performing the work is
computed on the basis of the quantity of work performed by
him,2 2 where the remuneration is computed in reference to
the amount which he himself must expend in performing the
work contracted for.
28
Although only five factors or criteria or tests of those pre-
viously listed have been expanded or elaborated upon, after
a fashion, it is to be understood that these are selected as
being more important, in the writer's estimation, than the
remainder, and also that all set forth are not contended to be
a complete and exhaustive coverage by any means. It is signifi-
cant to note that not one of these factors is in itself sufficient
to establish the relationship of employer-independent con-
tractor, but they must be used together and in a manner to
"tilt the scales", so to speak. As has been frequently observed
17. Note: 20 A. L. R. 745; 27 Am. Jur. 500.
18. 14 R. C. L. 73.
19. See Notes: 65 L. R. A. 507; 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 381; 19 ANN. CAS.
20. 20 A. L. R. 755.
21. Id. at 756; Note: 6 L. R. A. 461, 505.
22. See note 20, supra at 726; 19 ANN. CAs. 19.
23. See note 20, supra at 760.
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in the cases and by the authorities, no hard and fast rule can
be formulated to determine the relationship, but each case
must be determined on its own facts.24
LIABILITY FOR THE TORTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTOR
The majority of cases dealing with the law of independent
contractors arise out of tort. If the employer is sued and in-
terposes the defense that the person for whose acts he is
sought to be held liable for is an independent contractor;
logically, the first question to be determined is whether that
person is, in fact, an independent contractor, or merely an
agent or servant. In the event he is found to be an independent
contractor, a second question to be determined is whether the
employer is, nevertheless, liable for his tortious acts. The
scope of this discussion is confined to a consideration of the
second question, just raised.
As a general rule, under the doctrine, respondeat superior,
a master is liable for an injury to the person or property of
another resulting from the acts of his servant where they are
performed within the scope of his employment. 25 However,
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the re-
lationship of employer and independent contractor; and the
general rule is that an employer is not liable for the torts of
an independent contractor, or of his servants, or agents, in
the performance of the work.26 Several theories have been ad-
vanced on the basis of the rule but there are really but two
which are generally relied upon. The first of these is that one
ought not to be answerable for an injury resulting from the
acts of another over whom he has no control. 21 The second
theory upon which the rule is based is that it is in keeping with
considerations of public policy.
28
This general rule, as most general rules in the law, has its
share of qualifications and exceptions. Vicarious liability may
be imposed upon the employer in certain instances and under
certain sets of facts.
24. Re Murray, 130 Me. 181, 154 A. 352, 75 A. L. R. 720 (1931);
Note: 75 A. L. R. 726.
25. 57 C. J. S. 294; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 19 (1933).
26. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 409 (1934); II MECHEM, AGENCY, § 1917
(1914).
27. Harper, Torts, § 292 (1933); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Ad-
ministration of Risks, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929).
28. Note: 18 A. L. R. 807.
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Perhaps the first so called exception to the general rule of
non-liability, though not so strictly an exclusive tort by the
independent contractor as the personal negligence of the con-
tractor himself, is where an incompetent or negligent con-
tractor is employed. 29 That is to say, there is a duty upon the
employer to exercise due care in selecting a competent con-
tractor who will properly perform the duties or work con-
tracted for.80 There is another duty closely related with
this which is to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the work
after it is done or, in certain cases, during its progress, in
order to see that the work is done in such a manner as to in-
sure the safety of others.8' Also closely related is the proposi-
tion that even though the employer might not be liable for in-
juries happening during the progress of the work, he may be
liable after he has assumed possession and control of the
premises and the injury results from the condition in which
they are maintained.32 Also, along the same reasoning as to
the employer's liability being predicated upon his own per-
sonal fault, he is liable where he retains control over the work
being done by the contractor or interferes with it in such a
manner that the injuries to another naturally flow from such
conduct.33 Then, too, quite naturally, a ratification of the act
of the contractor will render the employer liable, since, in
effect, the act of the contractor becomes the act of the em-
ployer.34 These situations, among others, are not really gen-
uine exceptions, for liability is predicated on the employer's
own misconduct.
The first genuine class of situations in which liability is
imposed may be dominated "non-delegable duties". Where the
law imposes a definite, affirmative duty upon one by reason
of his relationship with others, whether as an owner or pro-
prietor of land or chattels or in some other capacity, such per-
son cannot escape liability for a failure to perform the duty
thus imposed by entrusting it to an independent contractor.35
The duty may be imposed by statute or municipal ordinance
29. 27 Am. Jur. 507; Note: 66 L. R. A. 942; 14 R. C. L. 80.
30. Ibid; Note: 30 A. L. R. 1539 et seq; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 411
(1934) - See Comment (a) for "meaning of a competent contractor."
31. See note 26, supra § 412.
32. II MECHEM, AGENCY, § 1920 (2nd Ed. 1914); Note: 31A L. R. A.
1029.
33. 27 Am. Jur. 510; Notes: 30 A. L. R. 1518; 66 L. R. A. 950.
34. Note: 30 A. L. R. 1535; C. J. S. 370.
35. HARPER, TORTS, § 292 (1933); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 287-296
(1934); Note: 23 A. L. R. 984 et seq.
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which prescribes or requires certain precautions or certain
acts. However, a violation of the statute or ordinance must be
shown to be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.30
Similarily, duties may be imposed upon those persons doing
work under licenses, franchises or corporate charters.37 Many
of the cases under these last two situations involve duties
imposed on railroads to perform affirmative duties toward
invitees and others to whom the occupier is bound to keep
his premises in a reasonably safe condition.88 Application of
this principle is also frequently found in cases where munici-
palities have contracted with others to keep their streets and
highways or other public places in repair.8 9 There is a non-
delegable duty in respect to work which will, in the natural
course of events, produce injury unless certain precautions
are taken.40 This exception does not embrace work which if
properly done will occasion no injuries but rather work in
which there is danger in the mere performance of it apart
from any negligence by the independent contractor or his
servants, which may generally be executed with safety if cer-
tain precautions are adopted.41 The non-delegable duty in re-
spect to work inherently or intrinsically dangerous seems to be
a mere broadening of the foregoing and they could well be
classified together. It is not essential that injuries to third
persons must necessarily follow from the doing of the work;
it is sufficient if the work be so inherently dangerous that in-
juries will probably be occasioned unless proper precautions
are taken.42 Also, if the work is inherently dangerous, it is
not necessary to show that the particular injury was foreseen
.or authorized.43 This exception is very broad and space does
not permit reference to the numerous, specific cases in which
work is viewed as inherently dangerous and the many tests
prescribed. (Suffice it to say that the danger must be sub-
stantial and recognizable.) 44 Another non-delegable duty arises
in situations where injury will result not from the manner
of doing the work, but from the doing of it at all. That is, the
36. Notes: 23 A. L. R. 989; 115 A. L. R. 979.
37. 57 C. J. S. 368.
38. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 292 (1934).
39. Note: 23 A. L. R. 1008; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 288 (1934).
40. Notes: 21 A. L. R. 1230; 23 A. L. R. 1016; 76 A. L. R. 1257; 14
R. C. L. 86.
41. 57 C. J. S. 361.
42. Notes: 14 R. C. L. 87; 23 A. L. R. 1095.
43. Notes: 65 L. R. A. 837; 23 A. L. R. 1090; 14 R. C. L. 87.
44. 57 C. J. S. 590.
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employer is answerable for injuries which necessarily follow
the performance of the work and which are not the result of
the collateral negligence of the contractor.45 Therefore, where
the act contracted for is illegal or wrong in itself, the fact
that it is performed by an independent contractor will not
save the employer from liability to a person injured by that
act.40 Similarly, where the act contracted for will necessarily
result in a trespass upon the right or property of another, the
employer is answerable.47 By the same token, where the act
contracted for will necessarily result in a nuisance, the em-
ployer cannot escape liability by employing an independent
contractor.48 The theory upon which these last three exceptions
is based seems to be that it would be against public policy to
absolve from liability one who directs the commission of an
illegal act, trespass or nuisance. These seem to be the main
exceptions to the general rule of non-liability on the part of
the employer of an independent contractor and a resort to
the authorities will reveal many others less significant or
bordering on those mentioned. Even before examining the
cases and from the mere reading of this brief discussion, the
following statement may well be true:
A number of factors concur to constitute . . . . such a
powerful argument for the liability of the employer of
an independent contractor that it would seem highly de-
sirable for the courts to adopt the rule of liability and
confine non-liability to a few exceptional cases.
4 9
CONTRACTS BY THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The general rule is that the employer is not liable to third
persons for contracts entered into with an independent con-
tractor."0 Thus we see that the general rule of non-liability of
the employer for the torts of an independent contractor is
equally applicable, if not more so, for the contracts of the
independent contractor. Perhaps the reasoning is that:
The contract case would seem to be much weaker, not
only because the third person has an opportunity, usually
45. Note: 14 R. C. L. 86; HARPER, TORTS, § 292 (1933).
46. Notes: 65 L. R. A. 746; 76 A. L. R. 1258.
47. Notes: 21 A. L. R. 1261; 76 A. L. R. 1258; 14 R. C. L. 89.
48. See note 47, supra.
49. HARPER, TORTS, § 292 (1933).
50. MECHEhi, AGENCY, § 40 (1914).
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denied the tort creditor, to ascertain with whom he is deal-
ing, but since his loss is a pecuniary one, there are not
the same social values demanding recognition as in the
personal injury cases.51
Of course, the same criteria or factors previously discussed
are employed to determine whether one is an independent con-
tractor or whether the action be one of tort or contract and
once again the vital factor is the extent of control held by the
employer. Perhaps it is not strictly true to say that there are
exceptions to this rule for we are dealing within the twilight
zone between an agent and an independent contractor and as
we have seen previously, the term "agent", "servant", and
"independent contractort' are not infrequently used inter-
changeably as the situation requires. 52 However, if an em-
ployer induces another, by his act or conduct, to believe that
the employee is only a servant, then he is estopped from as-
serting that he is an independent contractor,53 but a mere be-
lief not induced by the employer that one is a servant is not
sufficient to create an estoppel. 4 Thus we have a situation
bordering on agency by estoppel for it is necessary to resort
to terms of apparent authority, ratification, etc. From the
cases it seems that, as a general observation, one who is hired
to accomplish physical results and enters into contracts in-
cidental to the result is more prone to be looked on as an
independent contractor while one who is hired to make con-
tracts, as a salesman, broker, factor, etc., is more likely to be
looked on as an agent and liability ensues.
THE LAW AS DEVELOPED IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A broad and general picture of the law of independent con-
tractors has been painted and the main purpose of this article
has been reached; that is, the status of the independent con-
tractor in South Carolina and the governing principles laid
down by our courts. The reader need not expect glaring and
startling changes and differences in the South Carolina law
for as it has been observed:
51. See note 6, supra at 513.
52. See note 3, supra; see note 4, supra.
53. Notes: 20 A. L. R. 807; 19 ANN. CAS. 6
54. Id.
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The difficulty is not so much with the law, which is
certain enough, as it is with its application to particular
cases ...5
However, it should prove beneficial to examine the law in
South Carolina, the factors which are considered in determin-
ing the cases and since a review of each decided case is im-
possible, because of limitations of space, the writer will
attempt to cite all the cases in which the law of independent
contractors is considered.
At the outset we are confronted with the age old problem
of exactly who is an independent contractor. One of the best
definitions is found in Chatman v. Johnny J. Jones Exposi-
tion, 1nc.,GG which states:
Where the will of the employer is represented only in the
result, and not in the means by which it is accomplished,
and the employer retains no control over the employee as
to the manner of means of accomplishing the desired re-
sult, the employee is an independent contractor and he,
and not his employer, is responsible for his own acts and
conduct, and the relation is not changed by the employer's
reservation of the right of supervision and approval.
It is a matter of considerable difficulty to differentiate be-
tween an agent and an independent contractor. Even though
there is a written contract of employment, one must carefully
consider its terms for although a contract is artfully drawn
so as to relieve one of liabilities which accompany agency re-
lationships and is complete with a declaration that there is
no contract of agency between the parties, the courts will look
behind this and if a proper construction of its terms shows
the relationship of principal and agent, it will so hold re-
gardless of what names the parties call themselves.57
An employer cannot escape the consequences of the em-
ployer-employee relationship by calling his foremen in-
dependent contractors, by giving them the right to hire
55. See Note 6, supra at 502.
56. 212 S. C. 215, 47 S. E. 302 (1948) - Citing 2 C. J. S. 1027; 2
Am. Jur. 17; 27 Am. Jur. 481-488.
57. Tate v. Claussen-Lawrence Construction Company, 168 S. C. 481,
167 S. E. 826 (1931; McNeil v. Elective Storage Battery Co., 109 S. C.
326, 327, 96 S. E. 134, 135 (1917).
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and fire those working under them or by paying them
on a piecework basis.
58
It has also been recognized in South Carolina, in line with the
authorities generally, that notwithstanding the written con-
tract between the parties, other relationships may arise be-
tween them growing out of their course of dealings; so that
an employer may be an independent contractor as to certain
work yet be a mere servant as to other work for the same em-
ployer.5 9 Therefore it is important to have some guides or
factors to consider in ascertaining the employer-independent
contractor relationship. There are many well recognized ele-
ments which should be considered. The later cases in South
Carolina cite the approval and apply many of the tests laid
down in the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY while rec-
ognizing that the presence of one or more is not necessarily
conclusive. 60
The most important factor or element to be considered, as
is evidenced by its inclusion in every definition of an inde-
pendent contractor, is the extent of control exercised by the
employer. This factor is given great consideration in all the
South Carolina cases. In the first case concerning independent
contractors in South Carolina, Conlin v. City Council of
'Charleston"1 (of historical interest because it contains the
story of the first attempt after the Confederate War to re-
place the bell in the tower of St. Michael's Church, Charleston,
resulting in the tragedy which gave rise to the litigation), the
underlying basis for the factor of control was expressed in the
following manner:
A master is liable for the negligence of his servant en-
gaged in his business, because he selects his servant and
controls him. He should not be answerable for acts done
58. Lunder Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stukes, 164 F. 2d 571
(4th Cir. 1947).
59. Tate v. Claussen-Lawrence Construction Company, Note 57, supra
- citing 14 R. C. L. 676; Googe v. Speaks, 194 S. C. 218, 9 S. E. 2d
439 (1939).
60. See note 7, supra; Norris v. Bryant, 217 S. C. 389, 60 S. E. 2d 344
(1950) ; Allison v. Ideal Laundry, 215 S. C. 344, 55 S. E. 2d 28 (1949) ;
Chatman v. Johnny J. Jones Exposition, Inc., 212 S. C. 215, 47 S. E. 2d
302 (1948).
61. 15 RicH. 201 (1867 - Criticized in 29 A. L. R. 736 at 755 on
the grounds that the language used by Justice Wardlaw seemed to imply
that the master was responsible for dangers created in the place of
work by the negligence of a contractor.
12
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by the servant of another or by that other who is not
subject to his control.
The Conlin Case also held that to make a person an independ-
ent contractor, it is essential that he have such control of
the place as is convenient for doing the undertaker's work,
and for such time as the performance of the work required;
but, that rights of others, not inconsistent with this control,
can subsist along with it. In Rogers v. Railroad Co.mpany,6 2 it
was held that the reserved control, which is necessary to make
one an agent rather than an independent contractor, must be
both general and special, not only as to what work shall be
done, but also how it shall be done. That is, the mere fact that
one of the parties has the power to give general directions as
to what is to be done without control over the methods or
means of operation or that the parties have agreed to speci-
fied rules does not necessarily create a principal-agent rela-
tionship.03 Similarily, the retention of general supervision
which relates to the result is not conclusive. 64
Another factor to be considered is the kind of business or
work the person employed is engaged in. Thus in the Chatman
Case,5 in holding the owner of a minstrel show to be an in-
dependent contractor, the court considered that this was a
separate and individual business which was created and de-
veloped into a completed unit before the contract with the
defendant company. Closely allied with this factor is a con-
sideration of the skill which is necessary to perform the work
contracted for. Thus in two late cases, the court considered the
skill incident to the operation of a minstrel show 6 and the
skill required in the hauling of logs by a truck.6 7 In Norris v.
Bryant,"" the fact that the person employed operated a filling
station and that the hauling of logs was not a part of his reg-
ular business was also considered.
Another important factor to be borne in mind is the con-
sideration of who supplys the tools and material to be used in
the work and who supplys the workmen to do the work. Thus
62. 31 S. C. 578p 9 S. E. 1059 (1889) - Cited in 19 A. L. R. 245.
63. See Chatman v. Johnny J. Jones Exp. Co., note 60, supra, Norris
v. Bryant note 60, supra.
64. Ibd.
65. See note 56, supra at 220, 221.
66. Ibid.
67. Norris v. Bryant, note 60, supra at 404.
63. Ibid.
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in Tate v. Claussen-Lawrence Const:uction Company,69 it was
considered strong evidence of an agency relationship that a
gasoline truck driver used the implements and utensils of the
refining company rather than his own in the conduct of his
business. On the other hand, it is strong evidence that one is
an independent contractor if he furnishes his own implements
and utensils. 70 As to whose workmen are used, it was said
in the Rogers Case:
The point is, who is doing the work? Is the company
doing it by its employees, or is the contractor by his ?71
The question of who selects and pays the personnel is con-
sidered as well as the questions of which party may discharge
such personnel and which party has control of the contrac-
tor's servants.7
2
The method of payment to the contracting party is also of
some significance to be considered along with all the other
circumstances. Thus in the Norris Case73 it was held that the
fact that a person was to furnish a truck and driver and haul
logs at a certain rate per thousand feet was some evidence of
the relation of independent contractor but the fact that he
was to be paid by the quantity, rather than by the day or hour
was not conclusive of that relationship.
Also in the Norris Case it was observed that although one
is to carry public liability insurance on his vehicles and work-
men's compensation insurance on all of his employees, an in-
surance requirement of this nature in itself is not sufficient
to change the quality of a contract which otherwise clearly es-
tablishes the relation of independent contractors. 74
Many other factors are mentioned in passing and many
doubtlessly borne in mind by the court without being ex-
pressed. The most significant have been noted here from the
South Carolina cases and for a fuller discussion, the reader is
referred to the previous discussion and the authorities cited
therein.
69. See note 57, supra at 489; Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S. C. 211, 62
S. E. 2d 297 (1950).
70. See note 63, supra.
71. See note 62, supra at 386.
75. See note 61, supra at 211; see note 62, supra at 384; Banks v. Ex-
supra at 229.
73. See note 67, supra at 404-405.
74. See note 60, supra at 399 - citing 85 A. L. R. 784.
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TORT LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
The great majority of the cases in South Carolina involving
independent contractors have arisen out of tort, as have most
cases elsewhere, and therefore it is necessary to review the
law in this field at some length. As to the liability of the em-
ployer for the torts of an independent contractor, South Caro-
lina adheres to the same general rule which prevails else-
where; namely, that one for whose benefit work is being done,
is not held answerable for the negligence of an independent
contractor to whom he has committed the work to be done
without his control.75 South Carolina has not had -cases arising
under all of the exceptions mentioned previously but has had
some and they have conformed generally to the exceptions
mentioned.
The first exception was laid down in the Conlin Case which
observed that under suitable allegations, the employer might
be made responsible for the misconduct or negligence of a
contractor known to be unworthy of trust, to whom a work
involving danger to others is entrusted.76 This exception is
based on the personal fault of the employer rather than on
the fault of the independent contractor. Another exception
founded on that basis is that the employer is liable if he
ratifies the tortious acts of the contractor or by his own act
participates or receives the benefit of the tortious acts. Lia-
bility is not imposed by the relationship but upon the act of
the employer himself. Thus in Abbott v. Sumter Lumber Com-
pany,7 where a person employed by the defendant cut timber
upon the land of another and the employer received the tim-
ber from him, it was held that whether an independent con-
tractor or not, the defendant was liable because by his own
act he had ratified the contractor's acts and received the bene-
fits therefrom. In a similar case, where a contractor wrong-
fully cut timber from the lands of another and the employer
used that timber, the court held that the employer was liable
due to his own act of converting the lumber to his own use and
75. See note 61, supra at 211; see note 62, supra at 384; Banks v. Ex-
press Co., 73 S. C. 211, 63 S. E. 166 (1906); Caldwell v. Carroll, 139
S. C. 163, 137 S. E. 444 (1925) - See dissenting opinion by Justice
Cothran that Carroll was an independent contractor.
76. See note 61, supra at 211.
77. 93 S. C. 131, 76 S. C. 146 (1912).
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it was not necessary that he should ratify the acts of the con-
tractor.
7 8
The next type of exceptions to be considered delve into the
realm of "non-delegable duties." The first type of duties to
be considered are those which are imposed upon the employer
by statutes and ordinances or by franchises or charters. In
the Rogers Case, in which it was held that a railroad company
was not liable under the "fire statute" 79 for damages resulting
from a fire within the limits of its right-.of-way, caused by
acts of the servants of an independent contractor engaged by
the company to build the road, the court considered the prin-
ciple that where certain obligations exist, growing out of the
privileges and franchises granted to the corporation, which
would be inconsistent with the right of the company to employ
an independent contractor to meet such obligations, the cor-
poration cannot shift the responsibility to the contractor, but
the court remarked that no obligation of the defendant had
been pointed out inconsistent with having its road graded by
an independent contractor.8 0 It was observed by Justice Mc-
Iver, in perhaps the leading case in this state on this point,
although not involving an independent contractor:
When a railroad or other corporation receives its charter
from the State, conferring certain franchises, rights and
privileges, it is upon the consideration that such corpora-
tion shall perform the duties and fulfill the obligations
which it at the same time incurs. The fact that the corpo-
ration chooses to perform these duties and fulfill its ob-
ligations to the community through another, whether a
lessee or otherwise, cannot release it from the obligation
which it has assumed by the acceptance of its charter.81
Thus it has been held that the privilege granted to railroad
corporations to cross public highways is such a duty or obli-
gation which cannot be delegated through the operation of the
railroad by the independent contractor or a lessee.8 2 Also,
78. Crosland v. Graham, 83 S. C. 228, 65 S. E. 233 (1908).
79. S. C. CODE § 8362 (1942) - Provides for liability on the part of
a railroad Corporation (without regard to negligence) for fires started
by its locomotive engines or originating within the limits of its right of
way by the acts of its authorized agents or employees.
80. See note 62, supra at 387.
81. National Bank v. Railway Company, 25 S. C. 216 (1885).
82. Engelberg v. J. F. Prettyman and Sons, 159 S. C. 91, 156 S. E. 173
(1980)
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that the duty upon a municipal corporation to keep its streets
safe for the use of those entitled thereto is such a duty which
may not be delegated to an independent contractor so as to
relieve such corporation from liability for injuries which are
caused by defects or other unsafe conditions in its streets.8 3
One logical basis for the rule seems to be that the corpora-
tion cannot be permitted to enjoy the benefits conferred by
its charter without incurring the responsibilities incident
thereto. 4 A corporation has no implied authority to delegate
or relinquish its public duties to another and cannot do so
without statutory authority and escape liability. 5
Another well established exception, sometimes classed as a
separate exception and sometimes under the "non-delegable
duty" exception, is that the employer is liable for acts of neg-
ligence of his independent contractor where the work is in-
herently or intrinsicly dangerous to others. This exception was
seemingly first recognized in the Conlin Case in which the
following language appears:
If the work involves the creation of a nuisance, owner
and contractor become joint wrongdoers, and neither or
both must answer for the consequences. 81
Although not couched in terms of "inherent" or "intrinsic"
danger, it was correctly pointed out in a recent case that the
word "nuisance" as used therein was used to connote a condi-
tion of danger to others, temporarily, pending completion of
the work. 7 In Allison v. Ideal Laundry,"" which involved a
disastrous explosion of a laundry due to a faulty propane gas
system recently installed, it was held that the employer of an
independent contractor, who installed the system was not lia-
ble for the contractor's negligence. The reasoning used was
that even if a propane gas system is inherently dangerous,
the liability of the employer depends upon his antecedent
knowledge of the danger inherent in the work or a finding
that the average reasonably prudent man or corporation
83. Walsh v. Dawson Engineering Co., 159 S. C. 425, 157 S. E. 447
(1931); see also S. C. CODE § 7345 (1942) which confers a cause of
action for damages caused by defects in the street, mismanagement, etc.
84. Harmon v. Railroad Company, 28 S. C. 401, 5 S. E. 835 (1887).
85. Smalley v. Railway, 73 S. C. 572, 53 S. C. 1000 (1905); Hart v.
Railroad Co., 33 S. C. 427, 12 S. E. 9 (1889) ; Harbert v. Air Line Rail-
way, 74 5. C. 13, 53 S. E. 1001 (1906).
86. See note 57, supra, at 211.
87. Allison v. Ideal Laundry, 215 S. C. 344, 55 S. E. 2d 28 (1949).
88. Ibid at 350.
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should, in the exercise of due diligence, have known; and that
in the instant case no inherently dangerous nature had been
found by the employer after a diligent investigation.89 In a
late case in which this exception was attempted to be invoked
in regard to an injury caused by a logging truck, it was as-
serted that although a truck negligently operated on the high-
way is a dangerous instrumentality, the court was not ready
or willing to hold that the hauling of logs by a truck is so in-
herently dangerous as to make the owner liable for the negli-
gence of an independent contractor.9"
Many of the well established exceptions mentioned in the
previous general discussion have not had occasion to be in-
volved or have been overlooked, but there is no reason to be-
lieve that South Carolina would not follow the law that is
uniformly established elsewhere.
CONTRACT LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
The only case involving an action on a contract in which the
employer seeks to avoid liability on the grounds that the con-
tracting party was an independent contractor is Chatman v.
Joknny J. Jones Exp., Inc.91 There it was asserted that:
Where the will of the employer is represented only in the
result, and not in the means by which it is accomplished,
and the employer retains no control over the employee as
to the manner or means of accomplishing the desired re-
sult, the employee is an independent contractor, and he,
not his employer, is responsible for his own acts and con-
tracts .. . 92
The court held that the relationship of employer-independent
contractor, rather than principal-agent, existed between them
and the employer was exempted from liability. In contract
cases as well as in tort cases the general rule of non-liability
on the part of the employer applies and the same elements
and factors are considered in determining the relationship in
both.
89. Id at 351.
90. See Norris v. Bryant, note 60, supra.
91. See note 56, supra.
92. Ibid at 219.
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THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
Ordinarily, at common law, the contractee is not liable for
injuries sustained by the employees of an independent con-
tractor.0 3 The following discussion is concerned with the prob-
lem of whether or not the independent contractor and/or his
employees are within the coverage of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.
The pertinent section of the Act is:
Sec. 7035-22 (A) Rights of Employees of Subcontractors
-Rights and Liability of Contractor and Sub-Contractors
(a) Where any person (in this section referred to as
"owner"), undertakes to perform or execute any work
which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and
contracts with any other person (in this section referred
to as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance
by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part
of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be
liable to pay any workman employed in the work any
compensation under this article which he would have been
liable to pay if the workman had been immediately em-
ployed by him.
Where any person (in this section referred to as "con-
tractor") contracts to perform or execute any work for
another person, which work or undertaking is not a part
of the trade, business or occupation of such other person
and contracts with any other person (in this section re-
ferred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or per-
formance by or under the subcontractor of the whole or
any of the work undertaken by such contractor, then the
contractor shall be liable to pay any workman employed
in the work any compensation under this article which
he would have been liable to pay if that workman had
been immediately employed by him.
The settled law in this state is that the basic purpose of
the Act is the inclusion of employers and employees and not
their exclusion; and that its presumptions and its penalties
are directed toward the end of effecting coverage rather than
93. 57 C. J. S. 371.
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non-coverage. 94 However, the courts are without authority to
enlarge the meaning of the terms used by the legislature or to
extend by construction its scope and intent so as to include
persons not embraced by its terms; and one who seeks to
avail himself of the Act must show that he is within the
terms of the Act.95
With this basic rule of construction in mind, let us look to
the meaning which has been given to Section 7035-22 (A).
There is no holding in direct and unequivocal language that
the employee of the independent contractor as such (i.e. as
defined at common law9") is not within the coverage of the
Act but there is dicta to that effect.97 Then, too, the very
wording of the second paragraph of Section 7035-22 (A)
seems to indicate that the "contractor" (referring to the com-
mon law independent contractor) himself is liable for compen-
sation to the "subcontractor's" workmen rather than the con-
tractee (referring to the common law employer) where the
work contracted for is not a part of the trade, business or
occupation of the contractee. However, under the first para-
graph of Section 7035-22 (A), if his employees are perform-
ing or executing a part of the trade, business or occupation of
the "owner", it seems that one who would ordinarily be an
independent contractor assumes the role of a "subcontractor",
within the meaning of the Act, and the employees of such
"subcontractor" are covered by the Act. (The word "owner"
as used in Section 7035-22 (A) has been interpreted to be
synonymous with principal contractor; that is, the person
who is having the work done.98) Thus we see that liability is
not dependent upon the contractual relationship of the em-
ployees to the owner or contractee but is predicated on whether
or not the employees of the "subcontractor" are performing
a part of the trade, business or occupation of the owner or
contractee. 99 In fact, the real reason for the enactment of
94. Kennerly v. Ocmulgee Lumber Co., 206 S. C. 481, 34 S. E. 2d 792
(1945); Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co., 189 S. C. 188, 200 S. E. 727
(1939); Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., 208 S. C. 307, 38 S. E. 2d 4
(1946).
95. McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S. C. 173, 41 S. E. 2d 872
(1947).
96. See note 1, supra.
97. Miles v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 212 S. C. 424, 436, 48 S. E. 2d
26, 32 (1948); Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S. C. 336, 364, 2 S.
E. 2d 825, 837 (1939).
98. Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., note 97, supra at 362.
99. Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., note 94, supra at 311; Kennerly
v. Ocmulgee Lumber Co., note 94, supra at 488.
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this section was evidently a realization on the part of the
Legislature that it would not be fair to relieve the owner of
compensation to employees doing work which was a part of
his trade or business by permitting the owner to sub-let or
sub-contract some part of the work, for in many instances a
subcontractor would be financially irresponsible or the number
of employees under him would be so small that the subcon-
tractor would fall within the exemption afforded all employ-
ers of less than fifteen persons.' 00
Therefore a discussion of what is and what is not "a part
of the general trade, business or occupation of the owner" is
necessitated. The fact that the work is of an unusual nature
or requires special skill plays no part in deciding whether or
not a particular accident comes under the Act.1'0 Nor does
the fact that a commodity is essential and necessary in the
operation of a business.10 2 One suggested test is: was the em-
ployee doing something for the subcontractor which bore some
reasonably direct relation to the performance of the work un-
dertaken by the contractor? 03 Thus, in the Marshbanks Case,
an employee of one employed by a power company to paint
the company's poles was engaged in the trade or business of
the power company since maintenance of transmission lines is
an important part of that business. 0 4 It has been held that
the painting of a water tank was such a part of a cotton mill's
"trade, business or occupation" as to constitute the contractor
a "subcontractor", within the meaning of Section 7035-22 (A),
since a water tank is an integral part of a cotton mill for pro-
tection against fire. The mill was held liable for compensation
for the death of a workman employed by the contractor to do
the painting when the tank exploded. 10 5 It was held in a case
where an employee of a garage was injured by the explosion
of the engine of defendant's bus which the garage had been
called upon to repair in an emergency, that such repairs were
a part of the trade, business or occupation of the bus com-
pany, even though the company had regular shops for the re-
pair of its buses. 00 A truck driver for a "subcontractor",
100. Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., note 97, supra.
101. Ibid at 366, Bozeman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S. C. 479, 8 S. E. 2d
878; Berry v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, 114 F 2d 255 (4th Cir. 1940).
102. Miles v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., note 97, supra.
103. Smith v. Fulmer, 198 S. C. 91, 15 S. E. 2d 681 (1941).
104. Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., note 97, supra.
105. Bozeman v. Pacific Mills, note 101, supra.
106. Berry v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, note 101, supra.
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injured while delivering wood blocks to a veneer company
from its timberlands pursuant to a contract between the com-
pany and the "subcontractor", was held to be performing or
executing work which was part of the trade, business or oc-
cupation of the company.10 7 In the Kennerly Case,0 8 the fol-
lowing language was quoted with approval:
Various sorts of work carried on by independent con-
tractors or subcontractors for principal employers en-
gaged in lumbering or related occupations have been held
to be so related to the trade or business of the principal
employer as to charge him with liability for the compensa-
tion of injured employees of the contractor.
Well diggers injured by a dynamite explosion while employed
by a cotton mill in deepening a water well on a farm rented
by the mill to a sharecropper were held not to be engaged in
the course of the business of the mill. 0 9 By way of illustra-
tion in the Marshbanks Case, the court said that if a merchant
wished to construct an apartment house, it would not be a part
of the trade or business of the owner. 10 A gasoline filling
station attendant, while assisting the driver of a stalled bus
by pouring gas into the carburetor suffered severe burns when
the motor backfired, and was held to be a mere "casual" em-
ployee and therefore excluded by the Act."' Thus we see that
the phrase "a part of the general trade, business or occupa-
tion" is generally construed with a view to inclusion rather
than exclusion.
An interesting problem is presented by an analysis of Sec-
tions 7035-2 (B) and 7035-16 (B) in regard to "casual" em-
ployees. ("It is well settled that an employment is not casual
when a person is employed to do a particular service or class
of service, recurring somewhat regularly and with a fair ex-
pectation of continuance for a reasonable period."" 2) Section
7035-2 (B) provides as follows:
107. Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., note 94, supra.
108. Kennerly v. Ocmulgee Lumber Co., note 94, supra at 490 - Citing
an annotation in 150 A. L. R. 1251.
109. Patterson v. Courtnay Mfg. Co., 196 S. C. 515, 14 S. E. 2d 16
(1940).
110. Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., note 97, supra at 344.
111. Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Co., 207 S. C. 1, 35 S. E. 2d 42
(1945) - Compare with Berry v. Atlantic Grayhound Co., note 103,
supra.
112. Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, Inc., 188 S. C. 233, 198 S. E. 385
(1937) - Quoting an annotation, 60 A. L. R. 1197.
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Section 7035-2 (B)-The term "employee" means every
person engaged in an employment under any appointment
or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied,
oral or written, including aliens; and also including min-
ors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, but ex-
cluding persons whose employment is both casual and not
in the course of the trade, business profession or occupa-
tion of his employer.
Section 7035-16 (B)-This article shall not apply to
casual employees, farm laborers ...
Thus we see that 7035-2 (B) excludes as casuals only those
not so employed in the course of trade, business, etc., of his
employer; whereas 7035-16 (B) excludes all casuals. This ap-
parent conflict was mentioned in the Ward Case,n3 as a dis-
crepancy but was circumvented since the court felt that the
employee there was clearly not "casual". The Berry Case,"4
relying heavily upon a North Carolina decision," 5 held that
"casual" as used in § 7035-16 (B) should be construed in the
light of the definition of "employee" in § 7035-2 (B) and also
in the light of the broad provisions of § 7035-22 (A). Thus it
would be possible for one who is a "casual" employee to be
extended coverage by the Act if he was engaged in the course
of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his em-
ployer. However, in the Jolly Case,"0 the court disagreed with
this reasoning. In this case the court decided that § 7035-16
(B) prevailed and that all casual employees are excluded by
reason of the "last legislative expression rule"; that is, a sub-
sequent provision of a statute should prevail over a prior one,
the later being the last in point of time or order of arrange-
ment." 7 Therefore, as the law stands today, a "casual" em-
ployee is not within the coverage of the Act whether engaged
in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation
of his employer or not. In the McDowell Case, it was held:
The wording of the applicable section of the Workmen's
Compensation Act in this state (Sec. 7035-22 (A)), it
113. Ibid at 240.
114. Berry v. Atlantic Greyhound Co., note 101, supra at 258.
115. Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 153 S. E. 591
(1930).
116. Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Co., see note 111, supra at 11.
117. Ibid at 8 - Citing Feldman v. Tax Commission, 203 S. C. 49, 26
S. E. 2d 22 (1943).
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seems to us, clearly evinces an intention on the part of the
Legislature not to include therein a subcontractor or in-
dependent contractor, but only workmen or employees of
either the "owner" or the "subcontractor."'1 s
It is to be noted that this language excludes the claim of the
"subcontractor" personally and only those who can qualify as
workmen or employees of the "owner" or "subcontractor" are
afforded the coverage of the Act.
A very important point to be noted is that if the facts bring
the case within the terms of the Act, the employee is restricted
to his right of claim for compensation under the Act, and can-
not bring an action at common law. As was observed in the
Marshbanks Case :"9
The right of workmen's compensation is wholly statu-
tory, not existing except under the circumstances pro-
vided in the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is not a
common law right for the reason that the Acts are in
derogation of, or departure from, the common law, and
are not amendatory, cumulative, or supplemental thereto,
nor declaratory thereof, but wholly substitutional in char-
acter.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Since the establishing of the relationship of employer-inde-
pendent contractor depends largely upon the presentation of
the facts and since the relationship is often so difficult to
distinguish as well as to establish, it is important to know
upon whom the burden of proof rests. The general rule is
that one who seeks to shield himself from liability by the plea
of independent contractor should have the burden of proving
all the facts that make him, who would otherwise be a mere
servant or agent, an independent contractor. 20 In the Norris
Case,121 the court recognized that it is generally held that
where a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of master and
servant, and the defendant claims he is not liable because the
work was being done by an independent contractor, the bur-
118. See note 95, supra at 183.
119. Marshbanks v. Duke Power Co., note 97, supra at 363 - Quoting
from 71 C. J. 229-231.
120. See note 77, supra at 147.
121. See note 60, supra at 403 - Citing 27 Am. Jur. 538; C. J. S. 396;
Embler v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 457, 83 S. E. 740 (1914).
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den is upon him to prove such a relationship. However, the
court did not undertake to determine the correctness of this
rule but did assert that at least the burden of going forward
with the evidence on the issue of independent contractor shifts
to the defendant.
As a general rule, no presumption exists that an employee
is either a servant or an independent contractor.1 22 However,
where one is found in possession of the property of another,
using it in the service of such other, he is presumed to be
the servant of the owner and this presumption follows
throughout the entire case and requires rebuttal evidence.1 23
Therefore, the employer who has intrusted his property to
the person for whose acts he is sued, has an additional hurdle
to overcome.
It is generally held, where the question whether an employee
is an independent contractor or a mere servant depends upon
the construction of an unambiguous written instrument, that
the question is one of law for the court to decide. 24 However,
even where there is a written contract fixing the relationship
of employer and independent contractor, if there is evidence
of other contracts and connections between the parties tending
to create the relationship of principal and agent, it is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. 25 Where there is no written con-
tract and the relationship of employer and independent con-
tractor is sought to be established by the testimony of the
parties and their witnesses, it is error to direct a verdict on
the grounds that a person was an independent contractor if
the testimony is subject to more than one reasonable infer-
ence.' 20 It would be safe to say that in the great majority of
the cases, through conflicting testimony and evidence, the
question of whether or not one is an independent contractor
is one for the jury under proper instructions from the court.
122. 19 ANN. CAS. 6
123. Burbage v. Curry, 127 S. C. 349, 121 S. E. 267 (1923); wavis v.
Littlefield, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487 (1913) ; Osteen v. Oil Co., 102 S.
C. 146, 86 S. E. 202 (1915); and numerous other cases.
124. See note 62, supra at 384; Sams v. Arthur, 135 S. C. 123, 133
S. E. 205 (1924); Googe v. Speaks, note 59, supra at 215.
125. See note 57, supra at 486, 487.
126. Norris v. Bryant, note 60, supra at 404; see note 83, supra at
429; McKinney v. Saluda Lumber Co., 126 S. C. 503, 120 S. E. 234
(1923); Gomillion v. Forsythe, note 69, aupra at 233.
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TELEGRAPH COMPANIES AS INDEPENDENT GONTRACTORS
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In South Carolina the sender of a message is not responsible
for errors in the transmission of a message to the sendee for
the telegraph company is not treated as the sender's agent
but as an independent contractor. This view was adopted in
Eureka Cotton Mills v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,121 in
which the court observed:
The courts of some states hold that the sender is bound
by the terms of the message as delivered, and this view
is based upon the theory that the telegraph company is
the agent of the sender. Other authorities hold that the
telegraph company is the agent of both sender and ad-
dressee; while the English rule, which has been adopted
by other of our states, is that as between the sender and
addressee the telegraph company is not to be considered
as the agent of either party but as an independent con-
tractor, a common carrier of intelligence for hire, and is
liable in tort to either party, sender or addressee, for the
breach of its public duty. We hold this to be the correct
view...
This view was later affirmed by Harper v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,' 28 and seems to be the correct one for neither
the sender nor the addressee have any control over the trans-
mission of a message. The telegraph is viewed as a type of
public service and is under a duty to transmit a message cor-
rectly. A breach of that duty will render it liable to either
the sender or the sendee.129
O(ONCLUSION
Thus we see that for the most part, the status of the in-
dependent contractor in South Carolina is substantially the
same as elsewhere. The law can be stated in broad and general
terms but ultimately, each case must be decided on its own
facts. A mastery or at least a good workable knowledge of
this phase of the law is important as is evidenced by the
127. 88 S. C. 498, 70 S. E. 1040 (1911).
128. 133 S. C. 55, 130 S. E. 119 (1925) - For a full discussion of the
problem see Note: Contracts-Liability Resulting From Telegraphic
Errors, 3 S. C. LAW QUAR. 78 (1950).
129. See note 127, supra, at 511; note 128, supra at 60.
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number of decisions dealing with independent contractors
-which have been handed down since the passage of the Work-
men's Compensation Act in 1935. Doubtlessly litigation under
the Act will increase due to the trend of concentrating indus-
try within one State. The problem of distinguishing the inde-
pendent contractor from an employer is also important under
other Acts not dealt with by this note such as the Social Se-
curity Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Selective Serv-
ice Act, and the Sherman Act, to mention a few. Over and
above its relevance under these Acts, its importance still pre-
vails in common law actions which fall within the broad field
of agency. Therefore, it is hoped that this note will be of some
assistance to the practitioner and to the student in his attempt
to master the law of independent contractors.
HARRIS P. SMITH
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